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Abstract. In our previous work we used the combinatorial approach to
develop a simple model for Hamming weight leakage. In this paper we
go one step further by considering exponents to be random but co-prime
to some even composite number. This is based on the assumption that
a private exponent is a unit in Z∗ϕ(N), chosen uniformly at random. The
probability of such an exponent depends on the choice of the modulus
N , i.e. what type of primes are p and q. We consider safe primes, strong
primes and the situation where p − 1 and q − 1 are products of small
prime factors. The result is given by an upper bound on the information
leakage in this refined model. It is shown that the worst case information
leakage amounts to only 3.6 bits for 1024 bit moduli.
1 Introduction
Today many analysis methods exist which are used to attack implementations in
hardware and software of cryptographic algorithms. Rather than attacking the
algorithms themselves, specific properties of the implementation such as timing
behaviour [3, 8] and power consumption [9], during execution of the algorithm
are exploited to gain information about the secret key. These, so called side
channel attacks can be very effective in breaking the cryptosystem, necessitating
careful implementation and consideration of countermeasures.
In a first order approximation in a previous paper [1] it was assumed that
the secret exponents are chosen at random from the set of odd numbers. For this
random exponent model (REM) the exact probability distribution was derived,
and the entropy H(K) of the number of operations K determined. In this paper
the validity of this model is shown to hold when the exponent is relatively prime
to the Euler (Totient) φ function [7] of the modulus. We focus on RSA keys, i.e.
the triplets (d, p, q), where pq is the secret factorization of the modulus N , (so
N = pq) and d is the private RSA exponent. Our conclusions will be shown to be
consistent with those of [14]. Finally, when considering the use of strong primes
we conclude that the entropy does not significantly differ from the one derived
in the REM as introduced in [1]. Moreover, we prove that all options for primes
i.e. from safe to random primes, are compliant with the developed model. The
results are showing that this information is far from exploitable for the practical
bit-lengths in nowadays applications.
As related previous work we mention that of Waldvogel and Massey [14] in
which they considered the entropy of Diffie-Hellman keys.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review
shortly our previous work. In Section 3 the relevance of the random exponent
model is discussed for real-life RSA applications. An lower bound on the expo-
nent entropy is derived, showing that the REM provides a good approximation
for the exponent leakage of the more realistic model. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 First Approximation: The Random Exponent Model
and its generalization
In our previous work we focused on modular exponentiation which is used in the
RSA cryptosystem [12]. Modular exponentiation i.e. the calculation of Me mod
N is usually performed by use of the standard square-and-multiply algorithm
[6]:
Algorithm 1 Square-and-Multiply Algorithm (from MSB)
Require: M and e =
∑n−1
i=0 ei2
i = (e0, e1, ..., en−1)
Ensure: Res =Me
Res←M
for n-2 to 0 do
Res← Res2 mod N
if ei = 1 then Res← Res ·M mod N
end for
Return Res
The question is how much information can be obtained when observing the
total number of operations, i.e. modular multiplications and squarings, in a cer-
tain part of the secret exponent. Here, a computationally unrestrained enemy
is considered as we discuss the side-channel security in the sense of Shannon
Information Theory.
Assumptions for the REM:
1. The secret exponent d is an arbitrary odd number modulo N .
2. Timings for the operations of multiplying and squaring of two numbers are
the same. This assumption is realistic considering the required constant-time
implementations as the necessary condition for side-channel security. “Good”
hardware implementations nowadays meet this condition.
3. Each user chooses her/his private key independently and uniformly in the set
of all odd numbers {3, 5, ..., 2n−1}. In particular, for all d ∈ {3, 5, ..., 2n−1},
P(XA = d) = P(XB = d) = 12n−1−1 where P(XA = d) gives the probability
that Alice chooses the number d as her private exponent.
The number of exponents of length up to n bits with exactly k operations
involved in exponentiation was denoted with G(n, k). The probability distribu-
tion of K is given by: P{K = k} = (2n−1 − 1)−1G(n, k), where K denotes the
random variable associated with the number of operations in an exponentiation
with the randomly selected exponent. The probability that an attacker is able
to successfully guess the secret exponent d is of interest. He possesses the exact
information on number of operations k performed while exponentiation has been
done and he has a detailed knowledge of the algorithm of exponentiation and
the relevant bit-lengths.
We derived the expression for the mutual information I(K;E) between the
random variables K and E, where E denotes the variable associated to a ran-
dom exponent. This notion of given-away information of the key was already
introduced in [4].
With the aforementioned three assumptions we obtained the following lower
bound on the conditional exponent uncertainty:
H(E|K) = H(E)−H(K) ≥ n− 1− log2(2n− 3) bits. (1)
From (1) the logarithmic relation between information leakage and maximum
exponent length can be observed.
Figure 1 shows the exponent entropy loss upper bounds.
Fig. 1. Exponent entropy loss for two different models (Random Exponent Model
(REM) and Binomial Model (BM).
The previous results are generalized by considering the possibility that the
attacker is observing the random exponent in two or more parts. The following
Fig. 2. Random Exponent Model - Observation in Parts
result was obtained in [1]:
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Here H(Kt) denotes the total amount of information obtained by observing the
operations from all parts. Figure 2 shows H(Kt) as a function of the part-length
for a 1024 exponent on a log-log scale.
3 How relevant is the model
In this section we will look into the more realistic model in which exponents are
taken to be random, but co-prime to a random even composite number.
When using the RSA public key cryptosystem, one encounters the Euler
Totient function φ(N), where N is the modulus, usually a composite integer,
that is the product of two primes. The public encryption exponent e and the
corresponding secret decryption exponent d are related by the fact that they
are each others multiplicative inverse in the residue ring where the operation is
modular multiplication (mod φ(N)), i.e.: e · d ≡ 1mod φ(N). Clearly, e and d
must be units in the ring, i.e. GCD(e, φ(N)) = 1. The number Ne of exponents
satisfying this requirement is given by Ne = φ(φ(N)). This number of exponents
is of interest in problems where the total diversity of public-secret key-pairs is
relevant, e.g. in considering the exponent information leakage due to side channel
information. In the sequel we will look at the minimum and maximum values
that this number Ne can take on for various moduli N .
Given an integer N in its general form:
N =
∏
i
pi
ei , pi 6= pj
and all ei > 0, where pi are prime factors of N . Then, by definition
φ(N) =
∏
i
(pi − 1)piei−1 = N
∏
i
(1− 1
pi
) (3)
From the formulas above it is evident that the highest value that φ can attain
is N − 1, if and only if N is a prime. Moreover can it be seen from (3) that the
multiplicities ei do not matter, and hence the least value of φ occurs when N is
composite and equal to the product of many different small primes.
In the standard RSA setting the modulus N is the product of two distinct
primes p and q, and therefore φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1) = N − (p + q) + 1, which
always contains a factor of 4. If the objective is to have as many exponents as
possible, i.e. to get the highest value of φ(φ(N)), then clearly the best option is
that (p− 1) = 2r and (q − 1) = 2s, with r and s again primes.
3.1 Sophie Germain primes
For (p−1) = 2r and (q−1) = 2s, with r and s again primes one gets φ(φ(N)) =
2(r − 1)(s− 1). Prime numbers r with the property that 2r + 1 is again prime,
are known as safe primes [11] or Sophie Germain primes.
Suppose one uses safe primes, then we have φ(N) = 4rs and φ(φ(N)) =
2(r − 1)(s− 1), so we have
φ(φ(N))
φ(N)
=
1
2
(
1
s
− 1
r
+
1
rs
)
, (4)
showing that the fraction of real RSA exponents is about half that of the φ(N).
Also, φ(φ(N)) = 2(p−32 )(
q−3
2 ) =
1
2 (N − 3(p+ q) + 9). As the minimum value
of p + q is obtained for p = q =
√
N we have the upper bound φ(φ(N)) =
1
2 (N − 6
√
N + 9). Now if we assume that indeed p ' q ' √N , we loose no
more than approximately 1 bit in the entropy of the secret exponent and this
is comparable with our previous results when taking all odd exponents. Under
this assumption we arrive at
φ(φ(N))
φ(N)
=
1
2
(√
N − 3√
N − 1
)2
.
3.2 Strong primes
Let us consider strong primes, i.e. p = 2kpr + 1 and q = 2kqs + 1, where r and
s are large prime factors of p − 1 and q − 1 resp. and kp and kq are arbitrary
small integers [11]. We now have φ(N) = 4kpkqrs and consequently φ(φ(N)) =
(r − 1)(s− 1)φ(4kpkq), so one can write
φ(φ(N))
φ(N)
=
φ(4kpkq)
4kpkq
(
1
s
− 1
r
+
1
rs
)
(5)
It now depends on the factorization of kp and kq with how many bits the
entropy of the exponent is decreased. The smallest decrease occurs if kp and kq
are powers of 2, the reduction being 12 , or 1 bit in entropy. The biggest decrease
occurs if kp and kq are composite, containing many small distinct prime factors.
For example, suppose again that p ' q ' √N , and that both kp and kq are at
most 16 bit composite integers with values kp = 3 ·5 ·7·11·13 and kq = 17 ·19·23.
In this case φ(4kpkq) = 2 · 2 · 4 · 6 · 10 · 12 · 16 · 18 · 22 and the reduction factor
φ(4kpkq)
4kpkq
becomes 0.1636, resulting in a decrease of the exponent entropy of at
most 2.6 bits. The way strong primes are generated (see [2]), the values of kp
and kq are usually less than 16 bits for 512 bit primes. Consequently, the entropy
loss is also less than 2.6 bits.
Strong primes were introduced in the context of so-called “non-weak RSA
keys. A simple method for finding strong, random large primes was given by
John Gordon already in 1984 [2]. The reasoning behind it was that with strong
primes one counters factoring, as well as cycling attacks. There exist arguments
for both, using strong or just random primes. Rivest and Silverman [13] argue
that it is unnecessary to use strong primes in the RSA cryptosystem. Namely,
for the most recent factoring method based on elliptic curves (ECM) due to H.
Lenstra [10], strong primes offer no extra protection. On the other hand, Joye
et al. [5] state that, since strong primes can only yield a safer solution and it
is not much more difficult to generate them, it is better to use strong instead
random primes. Some standards still recommend use of strong primes for RSA,
for example ISO/IEC9594-8.
3.3 Random primes
Similar reasoning as in the previous subsection shows that a lower bound to
φ(φ(N)) is obtained by assuming φ(N) to be equal to 22 · 3 · 5 · 7 · 11 · 13 · 17 ·
19 . . . amax. In this case the fraction of exponents
φ(φ(N))
φ(N) is given by equation (3)
when taking amax for the largest pi. This bound is realistic in that it sometimes
refers to primes of the form (aj · . . . · ak + 1) that exist but sometimes they are
the product of two or more smaller primes. Figure 3 shows this bound for the
decrease of the exponent entropy as a function of bit lengths. As can be seen the
extra condition imposed on exponents results in a minor decrease of the entropy,
viz. at most 3.6 bits for 1024 bit RSA.
Let us consider an example. Take φ(N) = 22 · 3 · 5 · 7 · 11 · 13 = 60060,
so φ(φ(N)) = 22 · 4 · 6 · 10 · 12 = 28 · 32 · 5 = 11520. One candidate for N
is (2 · 5 · 13 + 1)(2 · 3 · 7 · 11 + 1) = 131 · 463 = 60653. The same holds for
N = 23 · 2731 = 62813. So a 16 bit modulus results in an exponent entropy of
somewhat less than 14 bits.
The conclusion from the above is that the diversity (or entropy) of the secret
exponents is a little bit less than assumed in our previous model. One should
consider odd numbers d, 3 ≤ d ≤ φ(N) − 1, that are relatively prime to φ(N)
and there exactly φ(φ(N)) of them. Hence, the lowest entropy is achieved for
22 ·3 ·5 ·7 ·11 ·13 ·17 ·19 . . . amax. The values of amax can be determined for 512,
1024, 2048 bit moduli and consequently 22 ·3·5·7·11·13·17·19 . . . amax computed.
The first 132 prime numbers were used to calculate the bound depicted in Figure
3.
Fig. 3. Entropy loss due to decomposition of φ(N) into smallest primes.
4 Conclusions
We have extended the validity of the Random Exponent Model to the more
realistic situation of RSA exponents which are co-prime to the φ(N). If one
considers the total number φ(φ(N)) of such exponents, it was shown that for
safe primes the available fraction of exponents is about one half of the total.
For strong primes this fraction can be somewhat less, depending on the small
factors in the φ(N). In this case the equivalent loss in entropy, assuming equally
probable and independent exponents, is less than 3 bits for 1024 bit exponents.
For the case of random primes an obvious lower bound to the fraction φ(φ(N))φ(N)
results in a useful upper bound for the entropy loss. This bound indicates a loss
of at most 3.6 bits for 1024 bit exponents.
The results of this paper indicate that the REM is a good way to model the
information leakage due to side channel analysis.
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